The Cold War wasn’t just a chess match between superpowers; it was also a theater for a handful of truly sinister groups that thrived on chaos, false‑flag attacks, and the manipulation of public fear. From covert press agencies masquerading as news outlets to shadowy military networks, these organisations plotted behind the scenes to destabilise democracies and tip the balance toward authoritarian rule.
Sinister Groups Behind the Strategy of Tension
11 Propaganda Due
One of the most intriguing pieces of the puzzle is the mysterious Propaganda Due (P2) lodge, uncovered in 1981. This Masonic order boasted three cabinet ministers, 43 parliamentarians, the heads of all three Italian intelligence agencies, 213 senior military officers, and a host of media and business elites. Described by many as a “state within a state,” P2 was accused of subverting the Italian government from within. While it likely didn’t plan the bombings directly, the lodge played a pivotal role in covering them up, shielding right‑wing perpetrators from scrutiny. Its connections to the Bologna bombing have been examined in depth, underscoring how deep the infiltration ran.
10 The OAS
In the early 1960s, a French extremist known as Yves Guillou—or Yves Guerin‑Serac—decamped to Portugal, enamoured of its authoritarian regime and its brutal war in Africa. Having been radicalised during France’s own Algerian conflict, he joined the Organisation de l’Armee Secrete (OAS), a right‑wing Franco‑Algerian paramilitary group that seized control of European enclaves in Algiers and Oran. The OAS launched a wave of terrorist attacks, including multiple attempts on President Charles de Gaulle, and was responsible for at least 2,360 deaths in the 15 months leading up to June 1962. Even after the OAS dissolved, Guerin‑Serac declared, “The others have laid down their weapons, but not I,” vowing to expand the fight beyond Portugal to a planetary scale.
9 Aginter Press
In Portugal, Guerin‑Serac founded Aginter Press, ostensibly a news wire service akin to Reuters. In reality, it was a fascist paramilitary outfit dedicated to battling communism worldwide. The group despised democracy, deeming it weak, and championed false‑flag operations as a means to sabotage left‑wing movements and empower the extreme right. An internal manifesto summed up its doctrine: the first phase would create chaos, then dismantle democratic structures under the guise of communist activity, with operatives infiltrating leftist groups to make the attacks appear as their work.
8 Ordre Et Tradition
Backed by Portugal’s secret police (PIDE) and funded in part by the CIA, Aginter Press expanded its reach across Europe and southern Africa. By the late 1960s, its private spy network rivalled the intelligence service of a medium‑sized nation. The agency recruited right‑wing mercenaries for colonial wars, ran training camps on counter‑insurgency, bomb‑making, assassination, and propaganda, and was linked—though contentiously—to the assassinations of African freedom fighters Eduardo Mondlane and Amilcar Cabral, as well as Portuguese General Humberto Delgado. After 1969, Aginter shifted focus to Europe, establishing the subsidiary Ordre Et Tradition, which could lobby politically without exposing the press‑agency cover. Within this front, a covert cell called the Army Organization Against International Communism (OACI) specialised in provocation and infiltration.
7 Organization Armee Contre Le Communisme International
The OACI was envisioned as a global paramilitary force. Its operatives appeared in Cold War hotspots, such as the United States‑trained Jay Sablonsky, who later led anti‑communist death squads in Guatemala. In Italy, the OACI gained notoriety by offering courses on bomb‑making, sabotage, and covert operations to members of the extreme right. Its doctrine rationalised terrorism as a tool to break resistance, force submission, and create a rift between the populace and the authorities. It distinguished between “selective terrorism” (targeting political cadres) and “blind terrorism” (sowing chaos among the masses). Many Italian right‑wing terrorists, including Stefano delle Chiaie, were OACI alumni, linking the organization directly to the later Years of Lead.
6 Ordine Nuovo
April 1969 saw two bombs explode in crowded Milan streets, injuring dozens but sparing lives. August brought simultaneous bombings on ten trains, again with no fatalities. The December Piazza Fontana blast, however, killed 17 and wounded 90, followed by three more bombs in Rome. Initial suspicion fell on left‑wing anarchists, with the police arresting railway worker Giuseppe Pinelli, who allegedly committed suicide by leaping from a police‑station window—a claim later disproved by autopsy.
As investigations progressed, evidence pointed to the far‑right Ordine Nuovo (ON), founded by journalist‑turned‑terrorist Pino Rauti, a former Aginter Press collaborator. In 1986, Guido Giannettini—co‑founder of the OACI—was convicted of planning the Piazza Fontana attack, only to be released on appeal. Subsequent trials convicted ON members Franco Freda and Giovanni Ventura for the 1969 bombings, though they were acquitted of the Piazza Fontana case due to insufficient evidence. Even after multiple convictions and appeals, no one remains incarcerated for the massacre, underscoring the tangled web of impunity surrounding these extremist networks.
5 Avanguardia Nazionale
The Piazza Fontana bombing inaugurated Italy’s “strategy of tension,” a campaign where right‑wing groups carried out terror attacks to discredit communists and anarchists. While leftist militants also engaged in targeted assassinations and kidnappings, the random bombings of civilians amplified public anxiety. Magistrate Guido Salvini testified that links existed between Aginter Press, Ordine Nuovo, and Avanguardia Nazionale. Aginter instructors had visited Rome between 1967 and 1968, teaching Avanguardia militants how to handle explosives.
Avanguardia Nazionale emerged as an offshoot of Ordine Nuovo, founded by Stefano delle Chiaie—considered too radical even for Rauti. Delle Chiaie openly admitted that the group acted against communists, the bourgeois state, and democracy itself, justifying violence as a necessary tool. He also claimed co‑founding Aginter Press alongside his French friend Guerin‑Serac, reinforcing the network’s tight interconnections.
4 La Rosa Dei Venti
Within the far‑right, a rift emerged over ultimate goals. Moderates sought a stronger presidency and the suppression of the Communist Party, while radicals dreamed of restoring Fascism. In 1970, a coup plot involving Stefano delle Chiaie aimed to install Prince Valerio Borghese—a former Mussolini‑era military commander known as “the Black Prince”—as dictator. The plan called for a televised proclamation declaring the demise of the existing political order, followed by the occupation of government buildings and RAI TV studios. The coup was aborted at the last minute for reasons that remain murky, ranging from internal doubts to alleged interventions by Richard Nixon or a Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean.
The failed putsch sparked an investigation into the Rosa dei Venti (“Compass Rose”), a coalition of extremist groups that had backed Borghese. In 1974, a magistrate ordered the arrest of General Vito Miceli, head of Italy’s SID spy agency, after evidence surfaced that he was a key member of the Rosa dei Venti.
3 SID
The Italian intelligence service SID proved to be one of the most shocking components of the strategy of tension. High‑ranking officers maintained close ties to extremist right‑wing groups and repeatedly obstructed investigations. For instance, SID helped OACI co‑founder Guido Giannettini flee Italy after the Piazza Fontana bombing suspicion fell on him, and it assisted Giovanni Ventura in evading prison.
In 1980, police raided the apartment of General Gianadelio Maletti, Miceli’s successor, uncovering a 1975 file that referenced an Ordine Nuovo member (Casalini) who intended to confess involvement in the 1969 attacks. The file instructed police to shut the case down before further testimony could be taken. Another example: after Vincenzo Vinciguerra’s 1972 car bomb killed three officers, senior intelligence officers fabricated anonymous confessions implicating the far‑left Lotta Continua. Five officers were later charged with obstruction of justice. Similarly, when Gianfranco Bertoli threw a grenade at a ceremony honoring police commander Luigi Calabrese, SID produced a report labeling Bertoli an anarchist—only to discover he had been indoctrinated by Ordine Nuovo, which had orchestrated the attack.
2 Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari
By the mid‑1970s, the political landscape grew hostile for the remaining extremists. Portugal’s dictatorship fell in 1974, prompting Guerin‑Serac and his Aginter operatives to seek refuge in Franco’s Spain, where they conducted false‑flag bombings of Algerian embassies to tarnish the Algerian opposition. Stefano delle Chiaie also fled to Spain, participating in the massacre of left‑wing protestors.
Franco’s death in 1975 and the subsequent collapse of his regime stripped the last European sanctuary from Aginter’s remnants. While Guerin‑Serac seemingly vanished—perhaps heading to South America—delle Chiaie resurfaced in Chile, establishing a press agency modeled on Aginter, and later in Bolivia, allegedly working as an assassin for Nazi fugitive Klaus Barbie. Together they helped execute the 1980 “Cocaine Coup” that briefly overthrew Bolivia’s government.
In Italy, a new right‑wing group called Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari (NAR) continued the strategy of tension. In 1980, NAR detonated a time bomb at Bologna’s Central Station, killing 85 and wounding hundreds—the deadliest right‑wing attack of the Years of Lead.
1 Gladio
After World II, the United States feared a Soviet invasion of Western Europe and, in the late 1940s, NATO established “stay‑behind” networks across the continent. In Italy, this plan materialised as Operation Gladio. Intended as a contingency force against a possible Soviet assault, Gladio supplied money and weapons to clandestine operatives.
However, the network quickly shifted focus. The CIA recruited anticommunist fanatics—including fascists—who redirected resources toward combating perceived Soviet infiltration within Italy. Weapons and explosives meant for Gladio fell into the hands of groups like Ordine Nuovo, intertwining the secret army with the country’s strategy of tension.
The first public mention of Gladio in Italy surfaced during Vincenzo Vinciguerra’s 1984 trial, when he testified about an occult structure capable of directing outrages and a secret force parallel to the armed forces, composed of civilians and military men ready to resist a Russian army. The exact role of the CIA remains contentious. Swiss historian Daniele Ganser argued that the agency was pivotal to the tension strategy, though his work faced criticism for relying on forged Soviet documents. Italian historian Aldo Giannuli countered, highlighting a parallel organisation—the Nuclei for the Defense of the State—directed by the Italian army, which eventually focused on internal communist threats, leaving Gladio to concentrate on external Soviet dangers. The true extent of American involvement in Italy’s Years of Lead remains a matter of heated debate.